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ACTION SPEAKS LOUDER THAN FORM:
THE CASE FOR PROTECTING ORAL COMPLAINTS UNDER THE FLSA
CAROLINE B. PARK
“We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade
but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 2
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation manufactures a variety of highperformance polymer products. 3 Kevin Kasten worked there for about three years as an hourly
manufacturing and production worker. 4 Saint-Gobain required manufacturing and production
workers—including Mr. Kasten—to don protective gear, sanitize their hands, and clean their
shoes before going to their workstations. 5 The location of the time clocks meant that workers
clocked in after donning the required gear, and clocked out before doffing the gear. Employees
like Mr. Kasten were not compensated for the time it took to don and doff.
Saint-Gobain had a Code of Ethics requiring employees to report, “known or suspected
violations of the Code or any applicable law.” 6 Saint-Gobain had an Employee Policy
Handbook that “encouraged employees to report complaints to their supervisors and to the
Human Resources Manager if the matter was not resolved.” 7 Following this protocol, Mr.
Kasten complained orally to several supervisors about the location of the time clocks, and his
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Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123–124 (3rd Cir. 1987).
570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009).
3
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F.Supp.2d 608, 609 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
4
Id.
5
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, No, 08-2820 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 2008).
6
Id. at 3.
7
Id.
2
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belief that the locations of the time clocks were illegal. 8 Saint-Gobain terminated Mr. Kasten in
December of 2006.
Kasten filed suit, alleging that his complaints were protected activity and that he was
improperly terminated in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”), 9 which guards employees who engage in protected activity from reprisal. The
district court granted summary judgment for Saint-Gobain, finding that Mr. Kasten was not
protected from retaliation because his oral complaint was not protected activity. 10
The location of the time clocks was illegal. 11 Mr. Kasten complained about a legitimate
violation, followed the employee handbook to the letter, and yet was still terminated. There is no
doubt that this scenario is concerning. This paper will argue that employees like Mr. Kasten
should have a remedy under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
form the complaint takes should not be the dispositive factor in the analysis of a retaliation
claim. Any discharge following an employee’s sufficient assertion of statutory rights is
discriminatory and in violation of § 215(3)(a).
The circuit courts are split over the interpretation of § 215(3)(a), and the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari of the Kasten case to decide if the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA,
which prohibits firing an employee because he has “filed any complaint,” requires a written
complaint. 12 Kasten declared that those circuits that had protected oral complaints were not

8

Defendant Saint-Gobain denied that Mr. Kasten made these complaints. Defendant moved for summary judgment,
so the facts were taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Kasten.
9
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
10
Kasten, 619 F.Supp.2d at 611.
11
Mr. Kasten’s case was originally consolidated with a FLSA collective action brought by other Saint-Gobain
employees seeking compensation for time spent donning and doffing. Mr. Kasten’s action was severed. The district
court granted partial summary judgment to the collective action, finding that their donning and doffing time was
compensable. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F.Supp.2d 941, 955–56 (W.D. Wis.
2008).
12
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), cert granted (U.S. March 22,
2010) (No. 08-2820).
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useful, because their holdings did “not specifically state whether the complaint in question was
written or purely verbal, and none discuss[ed] the statute’s use of the verb to ‘to file’ and
whether it requires a writing.” 13 This Note will argue that the decisions Kasten criticized have
embraced the most suitable interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision. Those circuits
evaluated the complaints in question based on their substance and sufficiency and not their form.
This approach is the one best suited to fulfilling the purposes of the anti-retaliation provision,
and it is this author’s hope that the Supreme Court will reverse the Seventh Circuit’s troubling
decision.
Part I.B of this paper will give background information on the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), and Part I.C will address retaliation provisions and a prima facie case of retaliation.
Part II identifies the recurring arguments courts use in assessing claims under § 215(a)(3). Part
II.A addresses the arguments under the related issue of the protection of internal complaints.
Part II.B focuses on the arguments made regarding informal complaints specifically. Part III
uses the traditional tools courts use to construe statutes to argue that the correct interpretation is
one that protects informal complaints. Finally, Part IV proposes the standard that courts should
apply when considering an informal complaint.
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA was enacted in 1938, largely in response to the Great Depression when “the
scarcity of jobs was perceived as an invitation to wage abuses by employers. . . .” 14 The purpose
of the FLSA when enacted was to improve “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of

13
14

Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840.
JOSEPH E. KALET, PRIMER ON FLSA & OTHER WAGE & HOUR LAWS 3 (1994).
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workers.” 15 Congress hoped the legislation would guarantee a fair minimum wage and
reasonable working hours in industries in which workers likely had unequal bargaining power. 16
The primary obligations of employers under the Act are in the areas of minimum wage,
overtime pay, and child labor. 17 Section 206 establishes a minimum wage owed to employees
covered by the Act. 18 The Act also regulates the workweek by requiring compensation of one
and one-half times the regular rate for a workweek longer than 40 hours. 19
There are—of course—enforcement mechanisms in place. To ensure compliance with
these regulations, Congress “chose to rely on information and complaints received from
employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.”20 The anti-retaliation
provision of the Act facilitates enforcement by declaring it unlawful to retaliate against an
employee for filing a complaint, instituting a proceeding, or testifying regarding a violation of
the minimum wage, overtime, or other provisions of the FLSA. 21 By offering protection, “[t]he
anti-retaliation provision facilitates the enforcement of the FLSA’s standards by fostering an
environment in which employees’ ‘fear of economic retaliation’ will not cause them ‘quietly to
accept substandard conditions.’” 22
To further these obligations, the FLSA offers remedies for violations of the regulations.
Section 216 lays out the penalties available for those who willfully violate the provisions of §
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29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor, and House Committee on Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 177 (1938).
17
JOSEPH E. KALET, supra note 13, at 3.
18
29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
19
29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
20
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
21
Section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA provides, in relevant part:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding[.]
29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3) (2006).
22
Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292). See also
Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 539 (2001).
16
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215. An employee may file suit in court, or the Secretary of Labor may file suit on an
employee’s behalf. 23 An employer who violates § 215(a)(3) can be liable for legal or equitable
relief, “including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of
wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”24
C. Retaliation in General
1. Retaliation Provisions
Virtually all federal anti-discrimination statutes have anti-retaliation provisions that
protect employees who complain about their employers’ practices. 25 The anti-retaliation
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, however, is slightly different from the provisions in
other statues, as it does not contain a specific “opposition” clause. 26 Courts and commentators
often use other retaliation provisions to bolster their arguments on how the FLSA’s provision
should or should not be interpreted. This technique will be further discussed in Part III.E.1.
2. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
Courts apply the shifting burden of proof scheme, initially articulated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green. 27 A prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA requires a
demonstration by the employee of the following: (1) he or she engaged in activity protected
under the Act; (2) he or she subsequently suffered an adverse employment action by the

23

29 U.S.C. §216(b-c) (2006).
29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2006).
25
See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12203 (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §623 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3 (2006); Vocational
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§793, 794 (2006); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§1140 (2006); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§215(a), 216(b) (2006); Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §2614(a) (2006); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §948(a)
(2006); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §1855 (2006); National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §158 (2006), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §660(c)
(2006); Railroad Employers Act, 45 U.S.C. §60 (2006).
26
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting employer retaliation because an employee has “opposed any
practice made unlawful by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or heading under this subchapter”).
27
413 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Richmond v. ONEOK Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 208–09 (10th Cir. 1997).
24
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employer; and (3) a causal connection existed between the employee’s activity and the adverse
action. Successfully establishing a prima facie case of retaliation creates a rebuttable
presumption that the employer unlawfully retaliated against the employee. 28
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of productions then shifts to the
employer to offer a legitimate reason for the plaintiff’s termination.29 If the employer articulates
a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged conduct, the presumption of retaliation
established by the prima facie showing “drops out of the picture.” 30 In order to survive summary
judgment at this stage, the employee must offer evidence tending to show that the employer’s
proffered reason is pretextual. 31 This Note analyzes the first element of the prima facie case—
that the employee engaged in activity protected by the FLSA.
II. THE RECURRING THEMES IN THE DEBATE OVER § 215(A)(3)
The language of § 215(a)(3) is subject to varying interpretations. Section 215(a)(3) of the
FLSA provides, in relevant part:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding[.] 32
Circuit courts differ in their willingness to read the provision broadly, which has resulted in
disparate levels of protection afforded to employees. The courts essentially “dispute the degree
of formality with which an employee complaint must be made in order for the employee to gain
protection under the statute.” 33 The first split in the courts is over the protection of complaints
made directly to one’s employer. Some circuits require a formal complaint with the Department
28

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–08 (1993).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973); St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 506–08.
30
St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 511.
31
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 793 (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
32
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)(2006).
33
Jennifer Clemons, supra note 21, at 536.
29
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of Labor, 34 while other circuits protect internal complaints. Part II.A will address the circuit split
over internal complaints. Though a clear majority of circuits protect internal complaints, there is
a wide discrepancy in the way courts have approached them. There are recurring themes that
reappear in the arguments for and against the protection of informal complaints. Part II.B will
identify the types of arguments and tests employed by the courts.
A. Internal Complaints as distinguished from External Complaints
The first obstacle to the interpretation of § 215(a)(3) is to determine if the language of the
provision protects complaints made directly to an employer, instead of filed with the Department
of Labor or in court. A majority of appellate courts have construed the language of the provision
to protect complaints made directly to management, so called “internal” complaints. 35 Courts
have engaged in a detailed statutory analysis to reach their conclusions on the matter.
1. Internal Complaints Protected
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that in order for the anti-retaliation provision to serve its
purpose, “it must protect employees who complain about violations to their employers, as well as
34

Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1993); Whitten v. City of Easley, 62 Fed. Appx. 477
(4th Cir. 2003).
35
See Kasten v. Saint Gobain Performance Plastics 570 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2009), cert granted (U.S. March 22,
2010) (No. 08-2820) (concluding that “the plain language of § 215(a)(3) includes internal complaints as protected
activity). See also Hagan v. Echostar, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008) (allowing an internal complaint to
constitute protected activity under § 215(a)(3)); Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2004) (protecting an
employee who protested his unequal pay to his supervisor); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the anti-retaliation provision must protect employees who complain about violations to their
employers to achieve the purposes of the FLSA); Valerio v. Putnam Assoc. Inc. 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999)
(concluding “that the animating spirit of the Act is best served by a construction of § 215(a)(3) under which the
filing of a relevant complaint with the employer no less than with a court or agency may give rise to a retaliation
complaint”); EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (protecting an employee who
complained to her employer about her pay); EEOC v. White & Son Enter. 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989)
(finding that complaints expressed to an employer about unequal pay constitutes an assertion of rights protected
under the FLSA); Love v. RE/MAX, 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that the FLSA applies to the
assertion of rights through complaints at work); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975)
(protecting an employee for complaining to employer about returning back wages). But see Ball v. Memphis Bar-BQ Co. Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that the FLSA does not prohibit retaliation “for an
employee’s voicing of a position on working conditions in opposition to an employer”); Lambert v. Genesee
Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2nd Cir. 1993) (“The plain language of this provision limits the cause of action to
retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying but does not encompass complaints
made to a supervisor.”).
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employees who turn to the Labor Department of the courts for a remedy.” 36 In reaching this
conclusion, the court parsed the language of § 215(a)(3). First, the court reasoned that the
sweeping implication of “file any complaint” means that the provision extends to complaints
made to employers. 37
The court then went on to address the implications of the verb “file.” The court found
support for its contention that “file” includes the filing of complaints with employers based on
common workplace practices. The court found it reasonable to assume that Congress drafted this
language with knowledge of the common practice, both in union and non-union workplaces, of
requiring employees to “file” grievances with their union or employer before pursuing any
further proceedings. 38
The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the plain language of § 215(a)(3) includes
internal complaints as protected activity. 39 For this court, the convincing argument centered on
the word “any” modifying “complaint.” 40 The statute does not otherwise limit the types of
complaints, “[t]hus, the language of the statute would seem to include internal, intra-company
complaints as protected activity.” 41
2. External Complaints Required
While a clear majority of courts protect internal complaints, 42 the Second and Fourth
Circuits interpret the anti-retaliation provision strictly, and require a formal, external
complaint. 43 In Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, the Second Circuit based its reasoning on the anti-

36

Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id.
38
Id.
39
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See supra note 34 (cataloguing cases protecting internal complaints).
43
See Whitten v. City of Easley, 62 Fed. Appx. 477, 480–481 (4th Cir. 2003); Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Company,
Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000); Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2nd Cir. 1993).
37
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retaliation provision of Title VII. 44 Title VII has a broader provision, protecting those who
“oppose any practice.” 45 The Second Circuit inferred that since the FLSA provision does not
have an opposition clause, it was not written to protect employees who make informal
complaints. The court based its reasoning on the plain language of the statute. It found that the
anti-retaliation provision explicitly laid out three protected types of behavior (filing a complaint,
instituting a proceeding, or testifying), “but does not encompass complaints made to a
supervisor.” 46 Though it noted that a number of circuits had held to the contrary, the Second
Circuit found that the plain language of the statute left no room for ambiguity. 47
The Fourth Circuit agreed, finding that it would be “unfaithful to the language of the . . .
FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions . . . to expand its applicability to intra-company
complaints.” 48 It held in 2003 that a firefighter who complained to management could not prove
a prima facie case of retaliation because the anti-retaliation provisions did not extend to internal
complaints. 49
B. The Debate Over Informal Complaints
If internal complaints are protected, the next issue the courts had to address is how formal
an employee’s complaint must be to warrant protection. Before Kasten, no appellate court that
had recognized internal complaints covered under the anti-retaliation provision had held that oral

44

Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d at 55. In response to this, the Ninth Circuit refused to use Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision as a basis for interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA. The Ninth Circuit pointed to the
differences in statutory drafting in 1938, when the FLSA was drafted, and in 1964, when Title VII was drafted. “In
short, we find the view. . . that Congress’ choice of words in 1964 can resolve the meaning of words chosen in 1937.
. . to be unpersuasive.” Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1005.
45
42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2006).
46
Genesee, 10 F.3d at 55 (citing EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992)(Suhrheinrich,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
47
Id.
48
Ball, 228 F.3d at 364.
49
Whitten, 62 Fed.Appx. at 480.
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complaints are not protected. 50 Even courts that agree that informal, internal complaints should
be protected have used myriad arguments to arrive at the same conclusion. Parts II.B.1 and
II.B.2 will address the dominant themes in the circuit courts’ reasonings.
1. Thematic Analysis Against the Protection of Oral Complaints
The circuits refusing to protect informal complaints are the same as those requiring
external complaints, with the addition of the Seventh Circuit, as per its holding in Kasten. The
Second and Fourth Circuits have demonstrated the same strict construction in their interpretation
of both issues, which is logical and consistent. They have refused to impute any additional
meaning on the provision beyond what is explicitly stated in the statute. The Seventh Circuit has
taken a different approach, and is the only one to have done so. The Seventh Circuit was willing
to “read into” the provision the protection of internal complaints, but not the protection of oral
complaints. This section will categorize and analyze the rationales typically employed by the
courts finding that oral or informal complaints should not be protected.
a. What Would Webster Do? The Dictionary as Binding Authority 51
The courts have often turned to the dictionary in this debate. Congress did not include
definitions for the terms “file” and “complaint” in the anti-retaliation provision, so many courts,
have used dictionary to define the terms. In Kasten, for example, the district court and the Court
of Appeals focused heavily on the definition of “file.” 52 The district court reasoned that the verb
“to file” requires a writing, because “[o]ne cannot ‘file’ an oral complaint; there is no document,
such as a paper or record, to deliver to someone who can put it in its proper place.” 53 Based on
50

Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 14 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (2008)(No. 08-2820).
51
Kasten argued in his appellate brief that “Webster’s Dictionary is not controlling authority in the Seventh Circuit.”
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, No, 08-2920. He argued that the
court overlooked many of the other possible definitions of “file” and blindly chose one. Id. at 12.
52
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain, 619 F.Supp. 608, 613 (W.D. Wisc. 2008); Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839.
53
Kasten, 619 F.Supp. at 613.
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this finding, the district court concluded that an employee’s complaint must be documented in
some form. 54
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiff, and the Secretary of
Labor as amicus, argued that “to file” can mean “to submit.” The Court rejected that definition
and found no ambiguity at all in the term. 55 Instead, the court relied on the first entry in
Webster’s dictionary, and found that it connotes a writing. 56 It found that the “natural
understanding of the phrase ‘file any complaint’ requires the submission of some writing to an
employer, court, or administrative body.” 57
b. Comparing to Title VII
Both the Seventh and Second Circuits have used the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII
as a way of proving the limited nature of § 215(a)(3).58 The anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII is broader, forbidding employers from retaliating against any employee that “has opposed
any practice” that is unlawful under the statute. 59 The Seventh Circuit used Title VII to
demonstrate that “Congress could have, but did not, use broader language in the FLSA’s
retaliation provision.” 60 It found unquestionably that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII
protects oral complaints, and therefore that Congress’s selection of the term “file any complaint”
is a significant one. 61
The other argument based on Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is that § 215(a)(3)
enumerates three types of conduct, while Title VII does not. Judge Suhrheinrich made that

54

Id.
Kasten, 570 F.3d. at 839.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
For the counterveiling argument regarding dictionary definitions, see infra Part II.B.2.a.
59
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
60
Id.
61
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840.
55
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argument in his oft-cited dissent in EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools. 62 In that case the
employee had protested to Romeo Community Schools that by paying male and female
custodians differently they were “breaking some kind of law.” 63 Judge Suhrheinrich
distinguished between the two anti-retaliation provisions and found that if this were a Title VII
action, he would agree with the majority that Romeo had unlawfully retaliated. 64 He refused to
read the broad “opposition clause” of Title VII into the FLSA.
c. Plain Language Analysis
Occasionally courts, without reference to the meaning of the words in § 215(a)(3) or Title
VII, hold simply that the plain language of the statute bars protection of oral complaints. The
Second Circuit used this plain language argument to find that external complaints are required
and informal complaints not protected. The Second Circuit represents the narrowest construction
of the statute. In Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, the court refused to impute any meaning onto the
provision beyond what is facially protected, regardless of the redundancy created as a result. 65 It
found that “[t]he plain language [of § 215(a)(3)] limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing
formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints
made to a supervisor.” 66
Another example of this type of reasoning is Judge Suhrheinrich’s dissenting opinion in
EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools. 67 In addition to comparing to Title VII, he argued that the
anti-retaliation provision has three specifically enumerated behaviors, and that “list comprises

62

EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992) For more on this dissenting opinion, see infra Part
II.B.1.c.
63
Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d at 989.
64
976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65
See infra Part III.E.2 for a discussion of the consequence of redundancy in statutory interpretation.
66
Genesee, 10 F.3d at 55.
67
976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the entire scope of complaints sufficient to fall under the statute.” 68 The plain language of the
anti-retaliation provision “does not prohibit employers from taking adverse employment action,
that is, retaliating, against employees generally.” 69
2. Thematic Arguments Protecting Oral Complaints
The circuits that have protected oral complaints, or those that have indicated that they
will, often use a test relying on the substance of the complaint rather than the form. Often, the
decisions do not focus at all on the form of the complaint, instead analyzing the substance
entirely. 70 This position “protects complaints made to an employer, but restricts the type of
complaints protected to those where the employee has made some assertion of statutory
rights.” 71 Here there is yet another split—those circuits who find ambiguity in the provision and
engage in detailed statutory analysis, and those who find simply that a statutory assertion of
rights triggers protection.
a. The Dictionary as a Source of Ambiguity
In contrast to the circuits that find the language of § 215(a)(3) unambiguous, the courts in
this category find ambiguity in the provision, and find that consulting a dictionary only
compounds that ambiguity. These courts “argue that the phrase is ambiguous because it is
susceptible to many different interpretations.” 72 Noting that the statute does not have definitions
for the pertinent terms “file” and “complaint,” the courts turn to the dictionary to demonstrate the
many definitions available. Instead of using the dictionary to settle the matter as the courts

68

Id.
Id.
70
See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839–840.
71
Jennifer Clemons, supra note 21, at 536.
72
Jennifer Lynne Redmond, Are You Breaking Some Kind of Law?: Protecting an Employee’s Internal Complaints
under the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 332 (2000-2001).
69
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described in Part II.B.1.a did, these courts use the dictionary as a way to show that varied
definitions exist.
The First Circuit, for example, found the word “complaint” especially vague. Turning to
the dictionary, the court found that complaint has dual meanings. While a complaint can be an
expression of protest, it can also be a formal allegation or charge. 73 Based on these alternate
meanings, the court noted that “[b]y failing to specify that the filing of any complaint need be
with a court or an agency, and by using the word any, Congress left open the possibility that it
intended complaint to relate to less formal expressions . . . conveyed to an employer.” 74 The
First Circuit then turned to the possible meanings of “file.” The court found the definition of file
“sufficiently elastic to encompass” informal complaints. 75
b. The Remedial Purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act
Courts have sometimes eschewed a detailed analysis in favor of a broader policy
argument. The Fifth Circuit protected an informal complaint, but did not engage in detailed
statutory analysis. Instead, in Hagan v. Echostar, the court announced that informal complaints
should be protected under § 215(a)(3) because “it better captures the anti-retaliation goals of that
section.” 76 However, the court articulated limitations on the informal complaints to be protected.
The court required the complaint to concern a violation of law. 77 If the employee is a manager
voicing the concerns of his or her subordinates, the manager must step outside the role of
manager and “make clear to the employer that the employee was taking a position adverse to the
employer.” 78 Though it recognized that the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision necessitates
73
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a broad reading, the Fifth Circuit found that the employee in Hagan did not do enough to make
clear to her employer she was taking a position adverse to the employer. 79
In EEOC v. White & Son, the Eleventh Circuit also used the purpose of the FLSA as the
basis for its reasoning. A group of female employees asked their employer why they did not
receive raises when their male coworkers did. Their boss told them to “take it or leave it,” so the
women left the premises. The court found that this was a discharge in retaliation for the
women’s opposition to the unfair practice. It found that a broad construction of the provision
would best further the purpose of preventing fear of economic retaliation against employees who
voiced grievances. 80 Guided by that principle, the court found the discharge of the women to be
retaliatory in nature and protected under § 215(a)(3).
The Eighth Circuit in Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha also protected an employee’s
assertion of rights. 81 The employee in that case protested what she believed to be the unlawful
conduct of her employer. The court found that her belief that the conduct was unlawful was
reasonable, and that “her lawful assertion of rights based on that belief must be protected.” 82
This finding was based on the purpose of the Act, and the court did not engage in a parsing of the
statute. Instead, it simply found that not protecting the activity in this case would violate the
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purpose of the statute “of preventing employees’ attempts to secure their rights under the Act
from taking on the character of ‘a calculated risk.’” 83
c. Comparing to Title VII
The Ninth Circuit engaged in detailed comparative analysis, rejecting the defendants’
argument that a comparison to Title VII urges the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
include informal internal complaints in the FLSA’s provision. 84 The court found that the breadth
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision could not dictate the appropriate construction of the
FLSA’s provision. 85 The FLSA was enacted in 1938, and Title VII was enacted in 1964. The
court noted that in 1938 “statutes were far shorter and less detailed, and were written in more
general and simpler terms.” 86 It was completely unpersuaded by the argument that “Congress’
choice of words in 1964 can resolve the meaning of words chosen in 1937.” 87
d. Avoiding Statutory Redundancy
While definitions of “file” and “complaint” are often the bellwethers of a court’s holding
on this issue, some courts find significance (and additional ambiguity) in the final part of the
provision. Section 215(a)(3) protects employees who file complaints “under or related to this
chapter.” 88 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the anti-retaliation provision only
applies to formal complaints filed with an employer because such a construction “would render
the ‘or related to’ language superfluous.” 89 Therefore, complaints “under” the FLSA are those
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filed in court and with the Department of Labor, and those that are “related to” the Act are those
complaints filed with an employer and relating to the subject matter of the FLSA. 90
The First Circuit dismissed another argument with the reasoning that such a construction
would create a redundancy. While this paper focuses on the first type of protected activity, the
filing of a complaint, the second type of protected activity is “institu[ing] or caus[ing] to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter.” 91 If the phrased “filed any complaint”
was read to require a formal filing, the additional clause protecting the initiation of a proceeding
becomes superfluous. 92 The First Circuit, invoking a traditional canon of construction, found
that for each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning, the phrase “file an complaint”
must be read to protect informal complaints. 93
e. Assertion of Rights as the Basic Test
The Tenth Circuit, unlike many other circuits, engaged in no statutory analysis
whatsoever. In Love v. RE/MAX, the court found simply that the FLSA applies to the unofficial
assertion of rights through complaints at work. 94 In that case a female employee wrote a
memorandum to the president of her company requesting a raise after learning that male
employees in similar positions were given raises. 95 Attached to her memo was a copy of the
Equal Pay Act. 96 Love was promptly fired. Using, in part, the purpose of the FLSA for
guidance, the court found her discharge retaliatory both under Title VII and the FLSA because
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the immediate cause of the employee’s discharge was her unofficial assertion of rights to her
employer. 97
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar holding in EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools.
Citing Love v. RE/MAX, the court held that an assertion of statutory rights triggers protection
under the provision, not just the filing of a formal complaint. In that case, the employee, a
school custodian, complained to the school district about her unequal pay and expressed her
belief that they were “breaking some sort of law” by paying her lower wages than previously
paid to male temporary custodians. 98 Following her protests, she suffered adverse employment
actions. The court found that the plaintiff had effectively set forth a claim of retaliation because
it is the assertion of rights that triggers the protection of § 215(a)(3), not the filing of a formal
complaint. 99
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit in Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha began its analysis of the
facts with the conclusion that “[t]he Act prohibits discrimination against an employee who
asserts or threatens to assert his or her FLSA rights.” 100 In Maxey’s an employee was fired for
refusing to participate in what she believed to be an unlawful scheme following a Department of
Labor investigation. The court found that the employee’s “lawful assertion of rights based on
that belief must be protected.” 101 The employee’s termination was retaliatory in nature since she
had asserted her rights on a good faith belief that her employer’s conduct was unlawful.
Therefore, she should have been protected by § 215(a)(3).
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III. THE CASE FOR A BROAD CONSTRUCTION
Part III will analyze the various methods of construction discussed in Part II. Part III.A
begins with a brief explanation of how remedial statutes are generally approached. Beginning
with Part III.B, the remaining sections are structured in the order that courts typically turn to
these methods of interpretation.
A. Remedial Statutes
The FLSA is remedial in nature, and as a result, should be liberally construed. It is a
general policy that remedial statutes are interpreted broadly to best achieve the purpose the
statute was enacted for. 102 A liberal construction can make a statute applicable in more
situations than a strict construction might allow for. 103 “A court may interpret a remedial statute
to apply in circumstances not specifically considered by the legislature so long as those
circumstances are within the ambit of the legislative purposes.” 104
Sometimes public values are employed as a justification for not using a strict statutory
construction. Public policy considerations, to the chagrin of some, exert a significant influence
in the process of judicial statutory interpretation. 105 When a public interest is affected, courts are
likely to interpret a statute in a way that favors the public.106 Courts sometimes reject narrow
constructions that “undermine the public policy sought to be served,” 107 especially “where a
narrow construction discourages rather than encourages the specific action the legislature has
sought to foster and promulgate.” 108
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B. Plain Meaning
When interpreting a statute, the first place to start is—of course—the statute itself. Plain
meaning is the default rule in statutory interpretation, and in most cases, the plain meaning of a
statute will answer the question. 109
Proponents of a literal construction of § 215(a)(3) first argue that the plain meaning of the
words “file any complaint” requires writing. 110 The conclusion to this argument is based on the
principle of expresio unius est exclusio alterius—by articulating three types of protected activity,
the inclusion of a fourth unwritten activity is expressly prohibited by traditional canons of
construction. However, numerous circuit courts have made persuasive arguments that the plain
meaning of the phrase “file any complaint” does not, in fact, require writing.
American courts commonly use dictionaries to ascertain the “plain meaning” of statutory
terms. 111 Of course, there are multiple reputable dictionaries, and often there are multiple
definitions for a word. Additionally, the accepted definitions for words may change over
time. 112 The terms “file” and “complaint” have multiple possible meanings. 113 Dictionary
definitions appear with regularity in the opinions and briefs of cases interpreting § 215(a)(3).
First, the verb, “to file.” The First Circuit noted that “file” encompasses two types of
actions. The first is “‘to deliver (as a legal paper or instrument) after complying with any
condition precedent (as the payment of a fee) to the proper officer for keeping on file or among
109
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the records of his office.’” 114 The court did not entertain any idea that this definition of file
supports a broad reading of the provision. The second definition, however, the court found to be
“sufficiently elastic to encompass” a broad construction. This definition is “to place (as a paper
or instrument) on file among the legal or official records of an office esp[ecially] by formally
receiving, endorsing, and entering.” 115
The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on contextual use of the term “file,” stating that
“[g]iven the widespread use of the term ‘file’ to include the filing of complaints with employers,
it is therefore reasonable to assume that Congress intended that the term be as used in § 215
(a)(3) to include the filing of such complaints.” 116
Next, the noun, “complaint.” The First Circuit again cited two definitions. It found that
“complaint” could be defined as “either ‘the act or action of expression protest, censure or
resentment: expression of injustice’ . . . or as a formal allegation or charge against a party made
or presented to the appropriate court or officer.’” 117 Therefore, complaint has meaning both as a
term of art in the legal system, and a general meaning. The First Circuit also that Congress’s
failure to specify that the complaint had to be made to a court or agency, “Congress left open the
possibility that it intended ‘complaint’ to relate to less formal expressions of protest . . .
conveyed to an employer.” 118
Despite the concise nature of the plain meaning analysis, it does not resolve the question.
Using a plain meaning analysis, circuit courts have arrived at two very different conclusions.
The Second and the Fourth circuits found that the plain meaning of the statute precludes the
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protection of complaints made internally, to one’s employer. 119 Yet other circuits, interpreting
the same text, concluded that internal complaints are protected activity under the provision. 120
The above demonstrates the inadequacy of the textualist approach to statutory
interpretation in this instance—“[w]hat the words of a statute say and what they mean are often
entirely different.” 121 The central problem with textualism is that statutory language can be
ambiguous or vague. 122 The varied meanings of the two words provide many possible
interpretations. The issue is that “the meaning of words (whether ‘plain’ or not) depends on both
culture and context. Statutory terms are not self-defining, and words have no meaning before or
without interpretation.” 123
An analysis focused solely on the meaning of the words “file any complaint” creates
more questions than it answers. When the plain meaning of a statute does not answer the
question, courts turn to other sources for help. Additionally, it is not unheard of for a court to
come to a conclusion at odds with the plain meaning of a statute. 124
C. Agency Interpretations
Since 1984, when the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 125 the role of agencies has increased. If the text of a
statute is ambiguous, courts look to relevant agency interpretations. 126 If the agency
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interpretations are permissible constructions of the statutory language, then those interpretations
are given controlling effect. 127
Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed an older standard as the “deference standard for
most administrative interpretations” when statutes are ambiguous. 128 Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 129
was a FLSA dispute over the “on call” time of fire-fighting employees at a plant, and the issue
was whether their “on call” time was compensable. A Department of Labor Administrator
issued informal rulings, in the form of an opinion letter, advocating a case-by-case approach to
such cases. The lower courts did not defer to the Administrator’s interpretation, and instead
found that the on call time was not compensable, working time. 130
When the Supreme Court heard the case, it remanded it to the lower court, and issued a
standard by which such cases should be decided. The Court said that an agency’s interpretations
would be given deference according to the persuasiveness of the interpretation. That
determination will be based on four factors—“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 131 Skidmore deference
applies to less formal modes of adjudication and rulemaking, while Chevron deference is still
applied to formal agency adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking. 132
The Secretary of Labor, as amicus in Kasten, argued that the Department of Labor’s
construction of § 215(a)(3) was entitled to Skidmore deference because it was a reasonable
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interpretation. 133 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, because it found that the
Secretary’s interpretation of the provision was a litigating position, not a “Department of Labor
regulation, ruling, or administrative practice.” 134 The court relied on a 1996 Supreme Court
decision, Smiley v. Citibank. 135 It is true that Chevron does not require deference to agency
litigating positions. 136 This is partly “because the agency is not exercising delegating authority
when it takes litigating positions and in part because of the fairness concerns that the agency as
advocate will not develop interpretations solely through the use of neutral expertise.” 137
The Secretary of Labor is authorized to administer the FLSA. 138 Through the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the Secretary investigates employment practices to
determine FLSA violations. 139 “[T]he Secretary of Labor has consistently interpreted the phrase
‘file any complaint’ to include protection for employees who orally complain to their
employers.” 140 The Secretary argued that this is demonstrated by the enforcement actions the
Department of Labor takes on behalf of employees. 141 This interpretation is more than a
litigating position—it is a repeated administrative practice.
While the Secretary’s position is not controlling, it should certainly be considered by
courts for guidance when construing the anti-retaliation provision. In Skidmore, the lower courts
did not take into account an interpretation of several FLSA provisions from the Administrator of
133
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the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. 142 The Supreme Court ruled that it the
interpretations were entitled to “respect” and it was reversible error not to take them into
account. 143 Agency rulings, interpretations, and opinions “constitute a body of experience and
informed judgments to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” 144 The
Secretary’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, as demonstrated in its amicus briefs is
consistent and thorough. The court in Kasten did not evaluate the Secretary’s interpretation for
indications of validity or persuasiveness.
D. Legislative History
When there is ambiguity in a statute, legislative history is often used to guide
interpretation and shed light on possible meanings or purposes. While the purpose of the FLSA
generally is well known, there is a lacuna of legislative history concerning Congress’s intent for
the scope of § 215(a)(3). “The provision was not the subject of congressional debate or
explained in the relevant reports.” 145 There was one general statement made that the provision
makes it unlawful “to do certain acts which violate provisions of the Act or obstruct its
administration.” 146 Legislative history is a tool that is essentially unavailable to those
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision.
E. Canons of Construction
The canons of construction or interpretation are a “hazily defined bunch of rules,
maxims, or homilies that courts can invoke to resolve interpretative problems.” 147 Although the
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traditional canons of construction may be prone to manipulation, 148 they are still often used and
cited to. Part III will analyze the thematic arguments discussed in Part II and compare them to
the accepted or common canons of construction. “[S]tatutory construction is an exercise of
practical reason, in which text, history, and purpose interact with background understandings in
the legal culture.” 149
1. Comparison to Other Statutes
As detailed above, many courts compare the language of the retaliatory provision of Title
VII to the equivalent provision in the FLSA. 150 Similar statutes are often an extrinsic source
used in statutory interpretation. In this approach to statutory interpretation, the courts
“compare[] the wording of comparable statutory provisions elsewhere . . . The conclusions to be
drawn from such comparisons are either that the provision at issue means the same thing as the
other provision, or that the provision at issue cannot mean the same thing as the other
provision.” 151
One similar approach to statutory interpretation is called the doctrine of in pari materia.
Statutes are “in pari material when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of
persons or things, or which have the same purpose or object.” 152 Similar statutes should be
interpreted similarly. The two anti-retaliation provisions, while they may serve similar purposes
of discouraging retaliation, are arguably not in para materia.153 The purpose of Title VII
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generally is to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, and the purpose of the FLSA is to
regulate working hours and wages.
Even when statutes are not found to be in pari materia, “construing statutes by reference
to others advances [the] values of harmony and consistency.” 154 An ambiguous statute may be
construed using the language of other statutes “which are not particularly related, but which
apply to similar persons, things, or relationships.” 155 Of course, there are limitations to this tool
of statutory interpretation. “The interpretation of one statute by reference to an analogous but
unrelated statute is considered an unreliable means to discern legislative intent.” 156
The Second Circuit, in its resolute holding that informal complaints are not protected,
used Title VII for comparison. 157

The court found meaning in the fact that the FLSA provision

has expressly enumerated types of conduct, in contrast to the broader language of the Title VII
provision. The Seventh Circuit confirmed the conclusion it reached that oral complaints are not
protected activity by noting that “Congress could have, but did not, use broader language in the
FLSA’s retaliation provision.” 158 It cited Title VII’s retaliation provision as evidence of a case
when Congress did chose broader language, and decided that there must be significance in the
fact that Congress chose more narrow language for the FLSA.
Though the statutes are not in para materia, some courts continue to rely on comparison
to Title VII as a definitive construction of the statute. This is a misguided use of this method of
statutory interpretation. While an analogy to Title VII could certainly guide the analysis, it
154
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should not be the dispositive factor in the interpretation of § 215(a)(3). The Ninth Circuit, as
addressed above, 159 rejected the argument that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII should
be used as a tool for interpreting the FLSA. 160 Given the decades that passed between the
enacting of each statute, the comparison is a weak one, and does not enlighten the analysis the
way the proponents of this argument suggest it does.
2. Avoiding Statutory Redundancy
It is a traditional canon of construction that every term in a statute must be given effect,
so that nothing in the statute is surplusage. 161 Part II.B.2.d discussed those courts that construed
“filed any complaint” liberally because to read it otherwise would render parts of the provision
redundant. It is a common canon of interpretation that “one part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.” 162
The First Circuit reasoned, “courts may ‘assume that Congress used two terms because it
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.’”163 In the case of the FLSA’s
anti-retaliation provision, this means that “filed any complaint” cannot mean a formal filing with
a court or government agency. If it did, then the additional language “instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter” would be meaningless and
unnecessary. If there is an alternative way of construing a provision that does not render another
part of it meaningless, that is the interpretation that should be applied.
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3. Legislative Intent
Courts may also use the intent of a statute as a tool for construing it.164 “A plain meaning
can be overcome by compelling evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” 165 Courts may
interpret a statute in a way that extends or restricts the language of the statute “by noting that ‘the
spirit of a statute governs the letter.” 166 “Where the purposes of a statute can be achieved only
by extending the operation of its language to its most inclusive meaning, even beyond its
common meaning, courts will do so.” 167 An extended interpretation may be used when a “statute
is ambiguous or capable of a range of literal meanings” 168 or when “another interpretation would
make for absurdity or injustice.”169 The Supreme Court has used this approach. 170 This theory
“renders statutory interpretation adaptable to new circumstances.” 171
So what is the spirit of this statute that should be kept in mind when construing it? The
Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the FLSA as to achieve certain minimum labor
standards for covered employees. 172 To achieve compliance, Congress “sought to foster a
climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.” 173
The Supreme Court has “made clear that the key to interpreting the anti-retaliation provision is
the need to prevent employees’ ‘fear of economic retaliation” for voicing grievances about
substandard conditions.” 174 The retaliation provisions are “remedial and humanitarian in
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purpose.” 175 Following the spirit of the statute, an extended interpretation of the literal terms
should be applied. “[A]s the FLSA was designed to encourage employees to report their
employer’s violations, the amount of protection afforded will directly affect the ultimate success
of this design.” 176
Extended interpretations that are guided by the spirit of the statute are appropriate when
the “statute is ambiguous or capable of a range of literal meanings.” 177 The terms of the antiretaliation provision are ambiguous, and the phrase “file any complaint” is subject to several
varied interpretations. Much of this paper has focused on the various sources of ambiguity and
confusion of § 215(a)(3). Courts time and time again have written on the varied meanings that
can be imputed from the phrase “file any complaint.” An extended interpretation is suitable to
achieve the purpose of § 215(a)(3)—to foster an environment in which employees are able to
voice grievances about working conditions without fear. To successfully create such an
environment, and achieve the purpose of the provision, it is imperative that the distinction
between oral and written complaints be abandoned.
One canon of construction also allows for reliance on the spirit of the statute when
“another interpretation would make for absurdity or injustice.” 178 The facts of the Kasten case
demonstrate the injustice that can result when oral complaints are distinguished from written
complaints and not protected. 179 Elevating form over substance to this degree is absurd. The
provision is intended to make employees feel secure enough to come forward with grievances
about working standards. Mr. Kasten followed the grievance procedure articulated by his
employer, and complained about a legitimate wage and hour violation. The adverse employment
175
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actions taken against Mr. Kasten will no doubt discourage his former co-workers from coming
forward with complaints. This decision is directly contrary to the purpose of the anti-retaliation
provision.
The absurdity is especially clear for employees in industries who most commonly
communicate with their supervisors orally. Employees with complaints may hesitate to
communicate those complaints in written form for fear that the gesture may, ironically, instigate
repudiation where an informal complaint might not. The Secretary of Labor has offered an
illustrative example of the outcome of this distinction: “[A]n employee who telephones the
human resources department asserting FLSA rights could be subject to discharge without
receiving the protection of section 15 (a)(3), while an employee who raises the same issue in
writing would be protected.” 180 It is unjust to not protect employees who make valid, sufficient
complaints. 181 The distinction between oral and written complaints creates an illogical system,
and nothing in the statute suggests that such a distinction was intended.
IV. PROPOSAL
No single method of statutory interpretation controls. Attorneys arguing for a certain
interpretation of a statute should take a cumulative approach, “taking the most convincing pieces
of whatever approaches best fit their side of the case.” 182 This author supports an interpretation
of the anti-retaliation provision that is a more dynamic approach than a plain meaning approach.
There a number of different conventional ways the terms “file” and “complaint” are used. As
Eskridge wrote, discussing the same conundrum of various definitions the Supreme Court faced
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in United Steelworkers v. Weber and Holy Trinity Church, “Upon what basis can we say that one
of them is morally more natural than the others?”183
“File” and “complaint” should be interpreted in light of the purposes the provision was
intended to serve. When assessing an employee’s activity, courts should engage in a somewhat
fact intensive analysis. In the circuits with more liberal standards, the test is often phrased as the
assertion of statutory rights. 184 What factors should be considered in determining if an
employee’s conduct is an assertion of statutory rights?
Courts should protect communications that are assertions of statutory rights, but there are
limitations on the activities that should be protected as informal, internal complaints. A
complaint must be specific enough to inform the employer of the alleged violation. The First
Circuit, holding that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who has filed a
sufficient complaint with an employer, also recognized the need for boundaries on the protection
afforded employees—
[N]ot all abstract grumblings will suffice to constitute the filing of a complaint
with one’s employer . . . “[T]here is a point at which an employee’s concerns and
comments are too generalized and informal to constitute complaints that are filed
with an employer within the meaning of the [statute].” 185
While a specific statute need not be named, it would be appropriate to require an employee to
specifically mention the activity that he or she believed to be unlawful.
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Courts should not require that employees mention the statute by name. A common theme
in these cases is employees who express their belief that their employers’ conduct is illegal.
They may not know what statute grants them rights. Requiring such knowledge of employees is
unfair and burdensome. It is not unfair, however, to continue to look for language from
employees reflecting a good faith belief that the employer’s conduct is illegal. These
requirements distinguish an assertion of rights from an ordinary complaint. For example, a
complaint about an overtime policy that did not include any notion that the employee believed
the policy unlawful may not come under the provision.
The following are examples of complaints that meet these criteria, modeled after
employees’ activities in real cases. First, an employee who tells human resources personnel “I
believe the location of the time clocks is illegal.” 186 Second, an employee who tells her
employer “You are breaking some sort of law by paying me lower wages than the men.” 187
These types of complaints express a belief in the illegality of the conduct, and mention specific
practices.
V. CONCLUSION
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics escaped from a directive intended to prohibit its
conduct. When interpreting the anti-retaliation provision, courts should be mindful of the
purpose § 215(a)(3) and the FLSA generally. When the Supreme Court hears the Kasten case, it
is this author’s hope that the Court protects oral complaints. If the Court does not, Congress
should act to protect what can only be described as the most socially responsible behavior—
employees attempting to hold their employers to the standards Congress has chosen to hold them
to. This holding is not anti-employer, but supports law-abiding employers. A literal reading of
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“file any complaint” with restrictive definitions of the phrase creates redundancies in the statute
and is not cohesive with the goal of the statute. It allows for a misinterpretation to create the
exact injustice that §215(a)(3) was intended to eliminate.
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